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THE 2015 CHANGES TO THE FEDERAL 
RULES MATTER FOR YOUR PATENT 
CASE AND TECH BUSINESS:  GETTING 
IN THE COURTHOUSE DOOR JUST GOT 
TOUGHER
By Matthew D’Amore
It used to be that a complaint for patent infringement 
would survive a motion to dismiss if it included:  
“1) an allegation of jurisdiction; 2) a statement that the 
plaintiff owns the patent; 3) a statement that defendant 
has been infringing the patent ‘by making, selling, and 
using [the device] embodying the patent’; 4) a statement 
that the plaintiff has given the defendant notice of its 
infringement; and 5) a demand for an injunction and damages.”  McZeal 
v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  So long 
as you followed these elements set forth in Form 18 found in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, your complaint was likely to pass muster.  See Id.; 
K-Tech Telecomms, Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d 1277, 1283 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1026 (2014).  
But the December 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure “abrogated” the forms in their entirety.  What does that mean  
for you?  Read on.
Below, we’ll give a bit of history on how we got here, and then offer some 
practical tips depending on which side of the “v” you’re on. 
A. Patent Cases Are (Now) Just Like Every Other Case
Rule 84 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure introduced a series of 
forms that became part of the rulebook.  It provided that “[t]he forms in 
the Appendix suffice[d] under these rules and illustrate[d] the simplicity 
and brevity that these rules contemplate.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 (2007) 
(emphasis added).  Form 18 (previously Form 16) identified the short set 
of five simple allegations for pleading patent infringement set out above.  
See McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1356-57.
Of course, in 2007 and 2009, the Supreme Court set out new standards 
for what a federal court complaint must contain.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).  Under Iqbal: 
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To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  A 
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 
factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing and quoting Twombly).  
The Court also made clear that “[t]hreadbare recitals 
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”  Id.  
It would not be a stretch to call the allegations of Form 
18 “threadbare,” as they fill all of four paragraphs.  In a 
trio of decisions between 2007 and 2013, however, the 
Federal Circuit confirmed that it would continue to look 
to the form for what sufficed to state a claim.  See K-Tech, 
714 F.3d at 1283 (“[A] proper use of a form contained in 
the Appendix of Forms effectively immunizes a claimant 
from attack regarding the sufficiency of the pleading…
[T]o the extent any conflict exists between Twombly 
(and its progeny) and the Forms regarding pleadings 
requirements, the Forms control.”);  R+L Carriers, Inc. v. 
DriverTech LLC (In re Bill of Lading Transmission and 
Processing Sys. Patent Litig.), 681 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (“R+L Carriers”); McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1356-57.
Eliminating the form removes the foundation from these 
decisions.  The question then is whether they stand on 
their own.  Here’s what the Advisory Committee Notes say 
about the deletion of Rule 84, which included the forms:
Rule 84 was adopted when the Civil Rules were 
established in 1938 “to indicate, subject to the 
provisions of these rules, the simplicity and brevity of 
statement which the rules contemplate.”  The purpose 
of providing illustrations for the rules, although 
useful when the rules were adopted, has been fulfilled.  
Accordingly, recognizing that there are many excellent 
alternative sources for forms, including the website of 
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 
the websites of many district courts, and local law 
libraries that contain many commercially published 
forms, Rule 84 and the Appendix of Forms are no 
longer necessary and have been abrogated.  The 
abrogation of Rule 84 does not alter existing pleading 
standards or otherwise change the requirements of 
Civil Rule 8.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 (Committee Notes on Rules – 2015 
Amendment).  Interestingly, the committee notes ignore 
the part of the rule stating that the forms “suffice under 
these rules,” on which the Federal Circuit had relied. As 
a result, the notes give zero guidance to patent litigants 
suddenly bereft of the safe harbor cited by the appellate 
court.
So, now what?
B. Tips for Getting in the Door and Staying 
There
1. Signs that Point the Way
Judge Dyk’s partial dissent in McZeal provides one 
interpretation of what Twombly and Iqbal might require 
in patent cases.  Seemingly prepared to tear up the 
form based on Twombly, Judge Dyk argued that “[t]he 
form fails to state which claims are asserted and which 
features of the accused device are alleged to infringe the 
limitations of those claims.”  501 F.3d at 1360 (Dyk, J., 
dissenting in part).  And for a claim under the doctrine 
of equivalents, Judge Dyk also argued that a complaint 
would need to “specify which limitations are literally 
infringed and which are infringed by equivalent [and], as 
to the limitations alleged to be infringed by the doctrine 
of equivalents, how the accused product is insubstantially 
different from the patented devices.”  Id.
R+L Carriers also provided guidance on what is needed 
for a claim of contributory and induced infringement, and 
this sheds light on direct infringement as well.  According 
to the Federal Circuit, “[t]o state a claim for contributory 
infringement, therefore, a plaintiff must, among other 
things, plead facts that allow an inference that the 
components sold or offered for sale have no substantial 
non-infringing uses.”  681 F.3d at 1337.  The R+L 
plaintiff, unfortunately, filed complaints that “actually 
make clear on their face that [the accused] products do 
have substantial non-infringing uses” and so pleaded itself 
out of court on that count.  Id. at 1339.
Similarly, for induced infringement, the Federal Circuit 
held that “complaints must contain facts plausibly 
showing that [the defendants] specifically intended their 
customers to infringe the [] patent and knew that the 
customer’s acts constituted infringement.”  Id.  As the 
court observed:
This determination is, of course, case specific.  In some 
circumstances, failure to allege facts that plausibly 
suggest a specific element or elements of a claim have 
been practiced may be fatal in the context of a motion to 
dismiss.  Or, as with R + L’s contributory infringement 
claims, facts may be pled affirmatively which defeat a 
claim on its face.  But, there is no requirement that the 
facts alleged mimic the precise language used in a claim; 
what is necessary is that facts, when considered in 
their entirety and in context, lead to the common sense 
conclusion that a patented method is being practiced.
Id. at 1342-43.  These points equally apply to pleading 
a claim of direct infringement without the benefit of the 
form and suggest a flexible, fact-dependent approach.
continued on page 3
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Furthermore, even before the change in the rules, 
some courts required additional specificity for claims 
of direct infringement.  For example, a complaint for 
patent infringement was dismissed in Macronix Int’l 
Co. v. Spansion Inc., where (a) “the claims for literal 
infringement d[id] not allege how the offending products 
[infringe] the claims recited in the [complaint]”; (b) the 
complaint “simply allege[d] that each element of a cited 
claim is infringed and then parroted the claim language 
for each element”; (c) the complaint “fail[ed] adequately 
to allege infringement under the doctrine of equivalents 
because [it] merely asserts liability under that doctrine in 
a bare bones, conclusory form;” and (d) “it [was] not even 
clear from the FAC what is alleged to be literally infringed 
and what was alleged to be infringed by equivalents.” 4 F. 
Supp. 3d 797, 804 (E.D. Va. 2014).  The court noted that 
“the showing need not be made in detail[,]... but must be 
made.”  Id. at 804 n.4.
2. The Form is Dead; Long Live the Form?
Despite Macronix, there’s an argument to be made that 
notice pleading according to Form 18 still suffices.  The 
argument goes like this:  Former Rule 84 stated that 
the form “suffice[d]” under the rules, and the Advisory 
Committee itself stated that removing the form did not 
change what was and was not an acceptable pleading.  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 (2015 Advisory Committee Note) (“The 
abrogation of Rule 84 does not alter existing pleading 
standards or otherwise change the requirements of Civil 
Rule 8.”).  Prior to the abrogation of the form, a panel of 
the Federal Circuit observed, without deciding, that it is at 
least possible that “[a] complaint containing just enough 
information to satisfy a governing form may well be 
sufficient under Twombly and Iqbal.”  K-Tech, 714 F.3d at 
1284.  Even the Supreme Court in Twombly noted that a 
change to a “heightened” pleading standard beyond Rule 
8 would require amendment to the Federal Rules.  See 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n.14.  In short, while the form 
is gone, one could argue that it was merely exemplary of 
what constitutes “a short, plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” (Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 8(a)(2)) and thus that the Federal Circuit jurisprudence 
that accepted such statements remains good law.
At least one district court has adopted this approach, 
finding a complaint sufficient where it contained the basic 
allegations set out in K-Tech and McZeal:
Though Form 18 and Rule 84 were abrogated from 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as of December 
1, 2015, the Advisory Committee note associated with 
this change directly states, “The abrogation of Rule 84 
does not alter existing pleading standards or otherwise 
change the requirements of Civil Rule 8.”  Fed. R.  
Civ. P. 84 (2015 Advisory Committee Note).  Thus, the 
Court refers to previously existing standards in ruling 
upon the instant Motion.
Hologram USA, Inc. v. Pulse Evolution Corp., No. 
2:14-0772-GMN-NJK, 2016 WL 199417, at *2 n.1 
(D. Nev. Jan. 15, 2016); compare with Zoetis LLC v. 
Roadrunner Pharmacy, Inc., No. CV 15-3193, 2016 WL 
755622, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 25, 2016) (finding claims of 
direct and indirect patent infringement failed to include 
information required by Form 18 and R+L Carriers).  
However appealing, this approach risks running afoul of 
Judge Dyk’s partial dissent in McZeal and the suggestion 
in R+L Carriers that Twombly and Iqbal must be 
considered when the form is not available.
3. Pleading Plausibility
We don’t know yet exactly what degree of specificity the 
Federal Circuit will require.  We’ll be learning what not to 
do as the case law evolves, but the cases provide at least 
some suggestions for a complaint to have the best chance 
of surviving a motion to dismiss:
• Do your pre-filing investigation.  Not only is it a 
good idea, it’s the law.
• Identify asserted claims.  (It remains to be seen 
whether phrasing like “at least claims 1, 5 and 7” or 
“including but not limited to claims 1, 5 and 7” will 
keep other claims in play.)
• Identify accused products with as much specificity 
as possible.  If accusing a class of products, provide 
some reason to infer that the class works in the 
same way.
• Provide a claim chart comparing the accused 
device to the claim language, using facts rather 
than conclusory assertions.
• Specify limitations met by the doctrine of 
equivalents, including facts supporting the claim of 
insubstantial difference.
• Plead specific facts supporting an inference of 
induced, contributory or willful infringement.
This is obviously a tall order.  Is it all necessary?  What we 
can say is that, just like the enormous growth in motions 
to dismiss brought under Section 101 after Bilski v. 
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) and Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. 
CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), the death of the 
form is sure to spark a growth in Rule 12(b)(6) motions 
to challenge pleadings seemingly lacking in one way or 
another.  A detailed and well-pleaded complaint is the 
surest way to overcome such a motion or avoid it in the 
first place. 
continued on page 4
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C. Tips for Slamming the Door Shut (or Just 
Leaving a Narrow Gap…)
If you’re on the other side of the “v,” considering a motion 
to dismiss or a motion for a more definite statement (Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Rule 12(e)) should be one of the first 
things on your list to consider.  And even if you can’t 
knock out the entire case, you may be able to take out part 
of it.  Here are some possible targets:
• Look for conclusory assertions that component x 
meets claim element y.  Even if claim charts are 
provided, conclusory recitations that just repeat 
claim language should be viewed skeptically.
• Watch for allegations against one product that are 
generalized for other similar products.  Are the 
facts alleged sufficient to make that generalization 
plausible?
• Look for gross mismatches between the number 
of claims identified or charted and the number of 
claims in the patents.  An allegation that “at least” 
claim 1 is infringed may provide little notice for a 
patent with sixty claims.
• Get specific regarding indirect infringement.  
Particularly for complaints that only allege indirect 
infringement (for example, because the direct infringer 
is a customer, mobile user, patient, or physician), 
the additional elements needed for pleading indirect 
infringement (e.g., knowledge, lack of substantial non-
infringing uses) may be weak points.
• Consider whether to target boilerplate claims of 
willful infringement.
The cost-effectiveness of a motion to dismiss in the path 
to a successful result of the case also should also be 
considered.  It may not matter that claims of contributory 
infringement are eliminated at the pleading stage if 
induced infringement will remain; it may be more cost-
effective to take both out at summary judgment later in 
the case.  Alternatively, a motion to dismiss or for a more 
definite statement may be useful to narrow the case to 
a certain set of claims or products if discovery can be 
limited to what remains. 
***
While the district courts may take varying approaches 
based on the facts before them (compare Macronix 
with Hologram USA) and Congress may add further 
complexity (by passing legislation that imposes new 
patent pleading standards), in the meantime the betting is 
that pleading a patent case is more difficult than it used to 
be and far more likely to be challenged.
WILL THE SUPREME COURT 
PUT THE BRAKES ON THE 
IPR TREND?  CUOZZO SPEED 
TECH., LLC V. LEE
By Matthew Kreeger, Brian Matsui, and Seth Lloyd
Not so fast:  the United States Supreme Court is set to review 
the America Invents Act’s (“AIA”) fast-track inter partes review 
(“IPR”) process.  On January 15, 2016, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 
No. 15-446, to address two questions:  (1) whether the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) acted within its 
rulemaking authority by adopting the rule that patent claims 
be given their “broadest reasonable interpretation” during 
IPR proceedings; and (2) whether a party may challenge, on 
appeal to the Federal Circuit, any part of the PTO’s decision to 
institute an IPR.
Whatever the Supreme Court decides, patent owners and 
potential challengers alike should watch Cuozzo carefully.  
Challenging a patent’s validity in IPRs has become a 
mainstay whenever a party is sued for patent infringement 
in district court.  Defendants view IPRs as a cost-effective, 
efficient alternative to often lengthy district court litigation, 
even though the AIA’s estoppel provisions require accused 
infringers to make certain invalidity challenges in only one 
forum or the other.  How the Supreme Court answers these 
two questions could make IPRs less favorable to patent 
challengers or more like district court litigation, either of 
which may lead parties to rethink when it makes sense to 
bring an IPR.  The Court will hear argument on April 25, 
2016, and should issue its decision before the Supreme 
Court’s summer recess in late June/early July this year.
THE BROADEST REASONABLE INTERPRETATION 
STANDARD
The first issue involves the PTO’s long-established practice of 
construing claims in a patent or application according to their 
“broadest reasonable interpretation” when determining the 
claim’s patentability.  The broadest reasonable interpretation 
arguably produces broader constructions than the standard 
federal courts apply when construing claims in litigation.  
This difference has been justified in part because, during 
PTO proceedings, a patent owner or applicant generally has 
the opportunity to amend its claims to avoid a potentially 
continued on page 5
